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
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THE SHABA INVASIONS

A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
Fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE



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
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THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

NAME OF CANDIDATE: MAJ MALUTAMA DI MALU

TITLE OF THESIS: The Shaba Invasions

APPROVED BY:

Gwendolyn C. Curren, Thesis Committee Chairman
(LTC G. C. Curren, MA)

Thomas W. Sweeney, Member, Graduate Faculty
(MAJ THOMAS SWEENEY, MA)

Richard D. Hirtzel, Member, Consulting Faculty
(COL Richard D. Hirtzel, Ph.D.)

Accepted this 18th day of June 1981 by Philip J. Brooker,
Director, Graduate Degree Programs.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

THE SHABA INVASIONS

By Major Mulutama di Malu, Zairian Army

91 Pages

This study was written to clarify the 1977 and 1978 invasions of Shaba Province, Republic of Zaire. The investigation is focused on an analysis of historical events leading to and during both invasions. This investigation reveals an insight into the politics and economy of Zaire particularly the Shaba region, the origins of the invaders and presents a detailed account of combat operations by the Zairian Armed Forces against the invaders.

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PREFACE

This thesis was written to clarify the invasions of Shaba during 1977 and 1978. To the best of my knowledge little information in English exists. During both invasions I was assigned to the Zairian Armed Forces General Staff in Kolwezi as an Intelligence Officer directly involved in day-to-day combat operations of the Zairian Armed Forces.

I hope this thesis will help those concerned to better understand the facts surrounding the invasions and the role played by the Zairian Armed Forces.

Fort Leavenworth
1981

MALUTAMA d1 MALU
MAJ., INF.
ZAIRIAN ARMED FORCES

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When I began this project, it was very difficult for me to select my subject. After a long time of thinking, I decided to explore the Shaba invasions which I think will clarify some facts and misinterpretation of the role played by the Zairian Armed Forces during the invasions.

My special thanks and gratitude also to LTC Curren and MAJ Sweeney of the U.S. Army who, despite their crowded occupations, played a major role in directing me in my research and in correcting my English. They helped me find documents and materials that helped me develop my thesis. Without their help, this study would have been impossible.

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Also, I must acknowledge my debt to my wife, Dina, and my children, Pembe, Mizila, and Swele. As a student at the Command and General Staff College and having decided to write a master's thesis, it was very difficult for me to spend time with my family. They understood my concern and supported my goal of completing this project. My wife has spent many long and late hours listening to my ideas, providing suggestions and has shared in my frustrations and joys, while ignoring her own pastimes. Likewise, my children accepted to play alone in recreation centers while they needed my company.

Finally, I would like also to thank Mrs. Ruth Parker and Jane Wheeler for working late in the evenings typing my papers.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to discuss the two invasions of Zaire and the impacts and effects of Zaire's failure of intelligence organization, both military and civilian, in both Shaba I in March, 1977, and Shaba II in May, 1978. This study will investigate the two invasions led by the ex-gendarmes of Katanga who had been underground in Angola and Zambia since 1963. This study will also investigate the causes and effects of the invasions, success and failures on the opposing forces and finally present conclusions on the overall effects on Zaire of these invasions.

To fully understand the problem of the ex-gendarmes of Katanga, we must first review the history of Zaire and Katanga Province (now Shaba), the origins of the ex-gendarmes of Katanga and the principal reasons that led the country into two wars within one year. I will discuss the invasion plans and I will describe the external influences in the province. The organization of the Zairian regular forces before and after the invasions and the counterattack will also be discussed. Finally, in my conclusions emphasis will be placed on the impacts to Zaire's economic health, and stability.

CHAPTER 2

HISTORY OF ZAIRE AND SHABA

Until 1908 the Congo was the personal property of King Leopold II of the Belgians. Late in the same year the Congo Free State became a colony of Belgium.

After a timid start, the Belgian government introduced drastic reforms. A policy of paternalism replaced many of the brutal traditions under King Leopold II's regime. Workers on the plantations and in the newly developed mines in Katanga enjoyed better wages and living conditions than most workers in other African territories. Large private and mixed companies were given tremendous concessions to exploit the minerals, especially in the Provinces of Katanga, Kasai and Orientale (see Figure 1). Meanwhile the educational system as well as the medical system was placed under the authority of the Roman Catholic Church.

The administration of the Belgian Congo, its public and technical services, was run almost exclusively by Europeans. Very few Congolese held positions of executive or operational responsibility. By 1958 no more than 10,000 Congolese out of a population of 13,500,000 were attending secondary or vocational training schools. Until 1956, there was no university in the Congo, and in 1960 after 80 years of Belgian rule there were only seventeen graduates who had received an




Fig. 1

education in Europe.¹ The National Security Force was officered entirely by Belgians and few educational facilities were open to the largely illiterate Congolese troops.

The obvious social segregation established by the colonial system caused some Congolese to organize political movements for independence. Municipal elections were held in 1957 in the three largest cities: Leopoldville (now Kinshasa), Elisabethville (now Lubumbashi), and Jadotville (now Likasi). All foreign names were changed in 1971 and traditional names were given to all people, cities, rivers, important places, etc...)

These municipal elections marked the emergence of political parties which had previously been banned. Antecedents of the political parties are to be found in cultural organizations based occasionally on old school associations (at best secondary schools conducted by missionaries) but more often on tribal allegiance. Many political parties were created upon tribal and language groups.² The Alliance Des Bakongo "Abako" Party of Joseph Kasa Vubu, for instance, represented the Bakongo ethnic group of the Lower Congo region. The Confederation Des Associations Tribales Du Katanga "Conakat" party in southern Katanga represented the Balunda ethnic group and provided support to Moise Tshombe. In the northern Katanga, the Baluba Du Katanga "Balubakat" party was created by the Baluba ethnic group and supported Jason Sendwe. The Kasai region created the Movement National Congolais "MNC" Party and supported Albert Kalondji. Another MNC Party supported Patrice Lumumba and was based on ethnic groups from Haut-Zaïre Region and one part of Kasai. These were the most important parties before independence was achieved on June 30, 1960.³

CHAPTER 3

ORIGIN OF GENDARMES

The first days after independence were miserable due to the lack of trained leaders, administrators, and professional men to assume the reins of authority and manage the country. Violence occurred first in the form of tribal rioting and then as a mutiny within the army. After this, civil strife spread rapidly. The new government was unable to exercise effective control, and Belgian efforts to assist in restoring order merely gave credence to the charge of external interference.⁴ Other political parties were created. There were no less than one hundred different parties all based upon ethnic and tribal groups. Kasa-Vubu of the Abako party became the first president of the country and Lumumba was the first prime minister.

The government that took over the Congo was headed by President Joseph Kasa-Vubu and Premier Partice Lumumba. Even though Kasa-Vubu was the head of state, Lumumba was well known and had more popular support and Eastern influences.

Joseph Kasa-Vubu was born in 1910 in Mayombe, in Leopoldville Province. He became President of the Alliance of Bakongo Tribe "Abako" Party in 1955. As a seminarian, he was educated in theology and philosophy, but decided not to enter the priesthood and became a teacher and an administrator. Partice Lumumba was born July 2, 1925 at

Katako-Kombe, near Lusambo in Kasai Province. He received a primary education and after attending high school in Leopoldville for a short time, he worked in Stanleyville as a postal employee. Fluent in French, Swahili and Lingala, he had tremendous appeal with mass audiences and was endowed with extraordinary energy and ambition.

In 1956, Lumumba was one of the Congolese invited to Brussels, Belgium for consultation on drawing up the uniform code to regulate government employment. On his return to the Congo, however, he was arrested and convicted of theft of postal funds. When he emerged from prison in 1957, his popularity greatly enhanced, he resumed his activities as an influential leader of the independence movement.⁵

Kasa-Vubu and Lumumba, both had been members of the Congolese nationalist movement. Kasa-Vubu, the more conservative of two, was not excessively hostile toward Belgium and the western powers. The office of the presidency which he came to occupy was largely an honorific post. Lumumba, the premier, who had been a more ardent nationalist than Kasa-Vubu, was resolved to sever all relations with Belgium after independence.

Both of these men were challenged in their views by Moise Tshombe, Premier of the Provincial Government of Katanga. Tshombe had been financed by the Belgian government during the colonial period. Tshombe was born November 10, 1919 in Misumba, Katanga. He was a wealthy man, conservative, and pro-Belgian. Thus the new Congolese leadership held political views covering the entire spectrum - from Lumumba's uncompromising anti-colonialism to Tshombe's pro-Belgian sentiments.

A few hours after its declaration of independence, the new government faced a crisis which threatened its very survival. The Congolese Army of 25,000 men, which had never had an African officer corps, rose up, demanding the ouster of its Belgian officers and pay increases for the enlisted men. Many disappointed civilians who had expected to inherit all Belgian possessions on Independence Day joined in the mutiny. During the following days the mutiny spread through the rest of the Congo. In major cities lawlessness prevailed and thousands of Europeans fled in panic. Premier Lumumba was unable to enforce the authority of the new government and unwilling to request Belgian help for fear of fanning the flames of violence still further.⁶

Eleven days after independence, Tshombe declared that Katanga was seceding from the rest of the country and forming a new state allied with Belgium. A few weeks later, Albert Kalondji separated Kasai Province from the country. At the same time, Katanga, the wealthiest part of the Congo requested Belgian military aid in order to suppress violence that was engulfing it along with the rest of the Congo. According to Brussels, Belgian troops reentered Katanga for the purpose of restoring order and peace. But several days later, the Belgian Government charged that the new Congolese Government of Lumumba had been unable to protect lives and interests of the remaining Belgian population and for that reason, the Belgian troops would march into Leopoldville as well. In fact, the Belgian troops did reenter the capital and shooting broke out between the Belgian troops on one side and Congolese soldiers and civilians on the other side. The Katanga secession was rapidly being consolidated with Belgian assistance. In order to maintain its independence, the Katanga Government had built

up a Gendarmerie of approximately 15,000 men with the help of the considerable detachment of Belgian officers and mercenaries from a number of western countries.

On July 13, 1960 members of Lumumba's regime cabled the United States Government for aid but both Premier Lumumba and President Kasa-Vubu immediately disavowed this appeal and stated that only a United Nations Force composed of military personnel from neutral countries could intervene. While the situation was becoming more dangerous Soviet Premier Khrushchev condemned the Belgian aggression and accused the United States of encouraging colonialism. The United States denounced the Soviet accusation as outrageous. The Security Council in an 8 to 0 vote, called on Belgium to withdraw its troops from the Congo and authorized the Secretary General to organize a United Nations peace keeping force. Both the Soviet Union and the United States agreed on the resolution.⁷

The United States was eager to interpose the authority of the United Nations between east and west and to prevent the Congo from becoming yet another battlefield in the Cold War; the Soviet Union on its part was eager to speed the withdrawal of the Belgian Forces and thus play its role as self-appointed champion of anti-colonialism. The solid backing of the African States for the resolution was a signal to the super powers to stand clear.

The East-West battle continued however. Premier Khrushchev announced that the Soviet Union was considering direct intervention in the Congo. He said that this might become necessary since he had received a telegram from President Kasa-Vubu and Premier Lumumba

stating that their lives were in danger and that they might be "compelled to ask for intervention by the Soviet Union if the western camp did not desist from aggression against the sovereignty of the Congo. The Soviet leader pledged Russia's support to Lumumba (who had strong ties with the Soviet Union) and told the West, "Hands off the Congo." The Soviet delegation in the United Nations demanded the evacuation of the Belgian "aggressors" within three days. The United States' representative, Henry Cabot Lodge, countered with the declaration that the United States "would do whatever may be necessary to prevent the intrusion of any military forces not requested by the United Nations." The Security Council unanimously barred unilateral intervention and urged the speedy withdrawal of Belgian Forces.⁸ The two superpowers were carefully excluded from the international contingent. Troops from twenty-nine nations, including Morocco, Tunisia, Ghana, Ethiopia, Mali, Guinea, Ireland, Sweden, and India, all under the United Nations' flag were deployed throughout the Congo to prepare the way for the more arduous task of building a responsible and viable Congolese government.⁹

Even while UN troops were arriving in the Congo, further complications were in the making. Tribal antagoisms erupted into local wars; South Kasai, following the example of Katanga, seceded from the Central Government, and Moise Tshombe not only refused to dismiss his Belgian advisors and troops, but announced that he would meet any attempt by the United Nations to enter Katanga with force. Meantime, Katangan Armed Forces were created and recruited among the inhabitants. They were called the Katangan Gendarmes, and the situation became more confused.¹⁰

In the light of all these developments, Dag Hammarskjold, the General Secretary of UN, thought it necessary in early August to return to the Security Council for a clarification of his mandate. The consensus between the superpowers continued to hold. Both the United States and the Soviet Union voted for a resolution sponsored by Tunisia and Ceylon which declared that the "entry of the United Nations' Force into Katanga was necessary, and demanded the immediate withdrawal of Belgian troops from the province".

The precarious consensus between the superpowers broke down, when, in Autumn of 1960, the new Congolese Government disintegrated completely. A power struggle between Premier Lumumba and President Kasa-Vubu erupted. The Soviet Union supported the Premier and supplied him with military equipment to crush the Katanga secessionist movement.¹²

Lumumba's whole attitude plus his acceptance of Russian aid caused increasing opposition to his rule in the Congo, in the west and among United Nations' officials, many of whom considered that his actions were making it impossible for the situation to be restored. As a result probably of pressure from all of these groups, Kasa-Vubu on September 5, 1960 used his power as Head of State to dismiss Lumumba and appointed Joseph Ileo as Prime Minister in his place. When Lumumba made it clear that he would contest this decision by force if necessary, United Nations' officials closed down the airport and the radio station in Leopoldville in an attempt to neutralize the situation. In spite of this it was clear that Lumumba was still in a stronger position than his rivals. The matter was never, however, put to the test because on September 14, Colonel Joseph Desire Mobutu,

Chief of Staff of the Congolese National Army (ANC) announced that the army was "neutralizing" all politicians and installing a government of university graduates and students to run the country.¹³

Though the college of commissioners, (as the student government was called) headed by Justin Marie Bomboko, was not able to exert much authority outside Leopoldville and Equateur Province and was unable to do anything to persuade the Katanganese to end secession; at least a certain amount of order was restored in the capital.¹⁴

Lumumba announced his total opposition to the college of commissioners but remained in Leopoldville under United Nations protection. Kasa-Vubu and Ileo on the other hand began to associate themselves more and more closely with Mobutu and in November the United Nations General Assembly agreed to seat the delegation accredited by Kasa-Vubu and the college rather than that accredited by Lumumba. This apparent recognition by the United Nations of Kasa-Vubu/Mobutu regime encouraged the Lumumbists to abandon Leopoldville and attempt to establish their own government in Stanleyville (now Kisangani), the capital of Orientale Province, where their support was strong. While trying to escape to Stanleyville, Lumumba was captured by Mobutu's troops and imprisoned in Thysville (now Mbanza-Ngungu). But his supporters, including Antoine Gizenga and Christoph Gbenye, succeeded in reaching Stanleyville and their government was established in December 1960. Once this government had been set up it was clear that it and not the Leopoldville regime controlled Orientale and Kivu Provinces, and the northern districts of Kasai and Katanga.¹⁵

On February 13, 1961 it was announced that Patrice Lumumba had been killed by hostile tribesmen in Katanga where he was transferred by the Central Government. This unexplainable event, which convulsed the Congo and brought it to the brink of civil war, also resulted in a partial restoration of the super power consensus on the Security Council. On February 21 the council passed its strongest resolution to date, urging the "The United Nations immediately take all appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo, including the use of force if necessary, as the last resort. The resolution also called for an "immediate and impartial investigation" of Lumumba's death.¹⁶

The United States and the western powers had some misgivings about the implications of the use of force, even as the last resort; however, they did enforce the tough paragraphs of the resolution. The fact that most of the African and Asian states solidly supported the resolution helped persuade the United States to vote for it. France, however, decided to abstain. The Soviet Union, which by now was waging a relentless war against Hammarskjold and the entire Congo operation, found itself almost completely isolated in this position in the general assembly. Fearful of alienating the African states if it vetoed the "force as the last resort" resolution, the Soviet Union abstained. Thus, with the reluctant approval of one of the super powers and the tacit consent of the other, the Security Council once again took over the political guidance of the Congo operation.

During the spring and summer of 1961 the Congo presented a picture of extreme confusion. Kasa-Vubu dismissed Ileo and appointed Cyrille Adoula as Prime Minister of the Congolese Government, but

Adoula was unable to control the entire country, especially Katanga, Kasai and Orientale Provinces.

On September 17, 1961, while engaged in an effort to persuade Tshombe to end hostilities, Secretary General Hammarskjold was killed during a night flight when his airplane crashed near Ndola, Northern Rhodesia. (Approximately 200 Kms southeast from Elizabethville).

From the time Katanga declared her independence in July 1960 to the middle of 1961, 14,000 Katangan gendarmes were trained by European mercenaries. Those mercenaries were recruited in Belgium, France, Rhodesia, and South Africa among former military men, adventurers, and the unemployed. The French mercenaries usually were connected with the "Algerian Secret Army Organization" or were veterans of the Indo-China War. During their service in Katanga, each mercenary earned \$1,000-2,000 monthly.¹⁷

In early December acting U.S. Secretary-General U Thant directed UN Forces to reestablish law and order in Elisabethville, capital of Katanga. This initiative resulted in heavy fighting. The UN moved in heavy reinforcements for an all-out offensive to gain control of Katanga. But some Western powers, notably Belgium and Great Britain, were still hesitant to see Tshombe suppressed. Apart from the considerable financial interests which both countries had in Katanga, Tshombe was seen as the only pro-western anti-communist, while Gizenga was seen as a serious communist threat to the Congo, and the Central Government merely neutral at best. Even in the United States, the Tshombe regime had some supporters. Great Britain refused to supply bombs to the UN to be used against Katanga. The western powers viewed the danger of communist influences as the greater threat, while the

anti-colonial African and Asian nations saw Tshombe as the tool of "imperialism", and thus the major danger. The Soviet backed the anti-Tshombe forces.¹⁸

This time the UN was determined not to stop too soon, as it had done earlier. United Nations Forces, supported by jet fighters, pressed on, and on December 20, 1961, Tshombe signed the Kitona Agreement, acknowledging the authority of the Central Government and promising to comply with the UN Resolutions requesting the removal of foreign mercenaries. But talks to implement this agreement were not begun until March 1961, and in June, after a second breakdown of discussions, it appeared that Tshombe still had no intention of ending his secession.

In late July 1962 U Thant submitted a plan for the reunification of the Congo, involving a fifty-fifty (Congo-Belgian) sharing of revenues from Katanganese mines, integration of the Katanganese Army with that of the Central Government, and the discontinuance of separate representation abroad, in return for which Katanga would receive considerable local autonomy. U Thant intimated that if this plan were not accepted economic pressure would be used, possibly extending to a complete trade and financial boycott. But neither Belgium, Britain, nor the United States wanted to allow the measures to go beyond the economic sphere, and Tshombe's conditional acceptance of the plan sufficed to avert any economic sanctions.¹⁹

By December 1962 the pressure for economic measures against Tshombe increased. Adoula had been requesting such measures since August, but at that time both Britain and Belgium had been opposed; nor had the United States actively supported such a move. Now Belgium

shifted its stand, in return for a promise from the Central Government to grant Katanga a large share of the mining revenue.

Fighting again broke out in late December, but Elisabethville was captured by UN Forces on December 28, and the important mining center of Jadotville fell a week later.²⁰

At first it appeared that Tshombe was going to fight to the end and pursue a scorched earth policy which would ruin Katanga, but he surrendered his last stronghold at Kolwezi in return for a general amnesty for Katanga officials.

By the end of January 1963 the resistance was ended, though the Congo's problems were far from over. At that time, Tshombe left the country for Madrid, Spain where he stayed in exile.²¹ In March, 1963, some 12,000 ex-gendarmes were still unaccounted for; but, for economic reasons, the United Nations Forces departed. Probably most of the gendarmes returned to their villages, entered the civilian work force, or joined the National Army. Some ex-gendarmes kept in touch with a nucleus of European mercenaries who were located across the border in Angola.²²

In 1964, the situation deteriorated. It was at this point that Moise Tshombe, returning from exile in Spain, announced that he was the only man able to control this situation and able to effect a compromise with the rebel bands. Since Adoula was now clearly quite unable to cope, Kasa-Vubu agreed in July to appoint Tshombe as Prime Minister for a transition period until elections could be held. At this time, the ex-Gendarmes had been incorporated into the National Army. Now Tshombe and the ex-Gendarmes, both former secessionists helped fight the insurrections then simmering throughout the country.

After Tshombe disappeared from the political scene, the Katangan contingent became involved in mutinies against the National Army in 1966 and again in 1967, aimed at restoring Tshombe to power. When these attempts failed, most of the contingent left for Angola where, led by renegade Brigadier General Nathael Mbumba, a former Katanga police officer, they joined a counterinsurgency force of the Portuguese colonial regime which fought against the various factions fighting for the liberation of Angola. After the end of the colonial regime, the ex-gendarmes linked their fortunes to the popular movement for the liberation of Angola (MPLA) and received military training from Cuban soldiers stationed in Angola.²³

As a result of a 1965 political standoff occurred between Kasa-Vubu the first President of the Congo and Tshombe's southern parliamentary coalition, the Military High Command seized power and named the army's chief of staff, a 35-year-old colonel named Joseph Desire Mobutu as the new president on 24 November, 1965. With the military providing the backbone for his government, Mobutu initiated a variety of programs to foster national unity, stability, and respect for the central government. In 1967, he formed the popular revolutionary movement (MPR) and announced that the country would convert to a single party system. In 1971, he launched an authenticity program which consisted of the depersonalization of Zairians from the colonial system and attempted to return to the cultural heritage of their ancestors. He renamed the Congo as the the Republic of Zaire, and replaced the colonial names of cities and streets with African

names. He rejected foreign names and ordered citizens to replace their Christian names with African ones, and adopted the name Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbendu Wa Zabanga for himself.

Zaire's Economy and the Shaba Region

With its 27,000,000 people, modern Zaire is a large country in the middle of Africa, inhabited by almost 200 different tribes. Zaire is approximately 1,000,000 miles square, an area eighty times the size of Belgium and four times the size of France. Mining is the main source of revenue and accounts for about two-thirds of all exports. Mining is carried out almost exclusively in the southern part of Shaba province into which extends into the Zambian copper belt, and where the state-owned "Gecamines" Company mines copper, zinc, cobalt, silver, uranium, cadmium, gold, and coal are found. Shaba is the largest and richest province of Zaire. The copper mines in Katanga are estimated to have reserves for 200 years. But, the particular significance of these deposits is that the mined ore, the "malachite," contains 5 to 15 percent pure copper, whereas, in Chili, America, or Canada, the relative yield seldom exceeds 1 to 1.5 percent. This means that the Gecamines productivity is nearly 10 times greater than other copper mining operations in the world with the same amount of workers and equipment.²⁴ Shaba's total copper production ranks sixth in the world, following that of Rhodesia.²⁵ About eighty percent of Zaire's natural resources are found in Shaba. There are numerous mines; one of the most famous is located at Shinkolobue where the uranium used for the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima was mined.²⁶ The other important

mining area is Kasai where 90 percent of the world's small industrial diamonds are found. The most important manufacturing area is Shaba, but copper earnings are now financing both the Inga Dam in western Zaire and the Maluku metallurgical complex near Kinshasa, where the country's second industrial region is located. Without Shaba, Zaire would be a comparatively poor country in spite of its plantations and other industries. The modern economic and social development of the country has been based on an elaborate complex of industrial and financial interests of which Shaba's mines are the core. The following production figures for 1977 serve to demonstrate the economic importance of Shaba to Zaire:

Copper:	450,000 tons
Zinc:	51,000 tons
Cobalt:	10,200 tons (60% of world production)
Cadmium:	246 tons
Silver:	85 tons
Gold:	112 kilograms

Because of its richness, access to Shaba Province is critical for many foreign countries; hence, foreign influences, both political and economic, play a role. The railroad line, Lubumbash-Likasi-Kolwezi-Dilolo and Lobito (Angola) is the most important passage for export of Zaire's copper, cobalt, maganese and other key minerals.

The Shaba region is inhabited by almost thirty tribes which may be grouped into three traditional empires: the Lundas, the Balubas, and the Bayekes. In the rest of Zaire there are an additional 170 tribes with nearly as many languages and dialects. In Shaba everybody speaks Swahili. For this reason, there is a certain homogeniety.

Katanga's autonomy was largely inspired by the desire of the Lunda and the Bayeke tribes to restore the ancient kingdom of Katanga as it was before the colonial period.²⁷ Also, from the start of negotiations for Congo's independence, the majority of Katanga's ethnic and tribal groups, through their representatives, demanded independence from the Congo. Even before independence, Tshombe, with his followers from Shaba's tribes, dared to speak of autonomy for Katanga.²⁸ The Belgian government turned down these demands, insisting that the Congo, whose boundaries the Belgians had themselves artificially created for administrative purposes, remain geographically as Belgium had created them.²⁹

Finally, it is known that the remnants of the ex-gendarmes and Katanga mercenary force, augmented by young recruits from Shaba, still led by Nathael Mbumba, invaded Shaba in March, 1977, and May, 1978.³⁰ The majority of the invaders are Lunda and Baluba from Shaba.

With this brief history and insight into the politics and economy of Zaire and particularly Shaba, and the origins of the Ex-Gendarmes, and before discussing the two invasions, let's discuss briefly about Zaire's relations with its neighbors.

With the exception of Angola and the popular Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), Zaire had good relations with Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi, Kenya, Tanzania, Chad, Central African Republic, Zambia and Uganda.

Before the first invasion in 1977 and before the outbreak of the civil war in Angola, President Mobutu tried on several occasions to reconcile the three Angolan Liberation Movements that were competing with each other: The popular movement for the Liberation of Angola

(MPLA), the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).

Mobutu felt close to Roberto Holden, leader of the FNLA who favored a no-Marxist Nationalism. He offered financial and logistical support which was endorsed by the United States, help that he denied to MPLA of Agostinho Neto, who were in turn supported by the Popular Republic of Congo.

Mobutu had little contact with UNITA of Jonas Savimbi but began in 1974 supporting the claims of the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC).

After NETO came in power, President Mobutu met Agostinho Neto on February 28, 1976, in Brazzaville and they both agreed to end all hostilities and differences. They agreed not to blockade each other's trade routes, and eventually to exchange refugees. Mobutu promised to stop all FNLA and FLEC activities. Subsequently Zaire did formally close its border with Cabinda and the Office of Roberto in Kinshasa.

There remained the unsolved problem of refugees. Thousands of Angolan refugees were living in Zaire, an unknown number of whom might be FNLA sympathizers, and in Angola there were the Katangan Gendarmes and their followers who posed a potential threat to Zaire as it will be demonstrated in the Shaba invasions.

In January 1977, Angola and Zaire announced that they would reestablish diplomatic relations, but tensions continued.

Zaire's relations with Brazzaville were not good nor clear before the invasions. Once again, no major incidents were reported, however, tensions existed between the two countries which supported different factions in Angolan Civil War.

CHAPTER 4

PREPARATION OF INVASION

The aggression against Zaire in March, 1977, was prepared by the ex-gendarmes and led by Nathael Mbumba and some mercenaries who had been underground in Angola since 1963. This invasion was actively supported by Cuban troops who trained the ex-gendarmes in Angola.³¹ Before the invasion in March, 1977, there were many reasons to believe that Zaire was going to be invaded by mercenaries and gendarmes of Katanga. However, the regular forces were poorly equipped and organized in Shaba, especially along the Zaire-Angola border, not because of negligence, but because of the agreements made at Brazzaville by both Presidents Mobutu of Zaire and Neto of Angola, which called for no armed forces along the common borders.³² Consequently, the regular forces had been drawn back from the border before the attack as a conciliatory gesture toward Angola.³³ For that reason there were only 76 soldiers stationed at Dilolo, 30 at Kapanga, 20 at Sandoa, 18 at Kasaji, and 6 at Kisenge. The 2d Airborne Battalion was stationed at Lubumbashi and the 3d Commando Battalion at Kamina, and both battalions were at 35 percent authorized strength. Kolwezi, with its many copper mines, had only 45 soldiers equipped with outdated weapons.³⁴

The military situation was not good in big cities like Lubumbashi, Kamina, Likasi, and Kolwezi, but it was worse in the rear areas of Shaba. The hydroelectric dam at Nzilo, about 15 miles south of Kolwezi, was secured and guarded by only one company which lacked communications equipment, and ammunition.³⁵

Because of the size and vital economic importance of Shaba, President Mobutu decided to garrison at least one division in the key areas. This situation was even discussed with some U.S. officials, and for that reason US Army General James M. Rockwell went to Zaire to discuss with the Zairian government the equipping and organization of that division. In 1975, 1976 Brigadier General Rockwell headed a U.S. team which surveyed the Zairian Armed Forces (FAZ) and recommended various changes over a 10-12 year period to upgrade FAZ. The proposal was completely changed after Shaba I.³⁶

Also, for unknown reasons, some local authorities and some high ranking military officers neglected the indications that preceded the invasion. Later those authorities were found guilty of being involved in a plot against the national security and of providing aid and military information to the ex-gendarmes. Those authorities were aware of the gendarmes' activities but didn't want to inform the high level officials; instead they caused confusion and issued contradictory information.³⁷

Some information and reports made by loyal officers, soldiers, and civilians were neglected. One officer was even punished because he was considered a panic-maker by reporting such information about the invasion plan and the gendarmes activities prior to the invasion.³⁸

The invasion could have been avoided if both civilian and military intelligence personnel had taken seriously their responsibilities and exploited the situation.

On August 8 and 10, October 18 and 23, and December 24, 1971, acts of kidnapping of 43 children between 14 and 16 years of age occurred in various Zairian villages such as Kayebeta, Shatahlonga, Tshiwojine, Kanyama and Mususu along the Angola border.³⁹ These acts were done by the gendarmes. The young boys were obliged to follow them to Angola where they were indoctrinated, received military training and joined the gendarmes' organization. It is known that those boys were among the gendarmes who later invaded Shaba. The Mayor of Dilolo reported the incidents and requested one company of soldiers to assure security in the area.⁴⁰

On December, 1972, the platoon leader at Dilolo reported that the gendarmes had constructed three base camps at Cazombo, Tshimbima, and Luso in Angola, only about five miles from the Zairian border.⁴¹

On June 21, 1976, Second Lieutenant Tshiony Tshilamo, platoon leader at Kapanga, reported that General Mbumba, leader of the gendarmes, was recruiting young Zairians from the Lunda Tribe in the two Zairian villages of Ntende and Rubuiza which are located about 130 Km from Kapanga. The Chiefs of these two villages had one small boat for the transportation of the recruits to Angola. In his report Second Lieutenant Tshiony emphasized that the situation was serious but he was unable to go personally to those two villages for an investigation because of the lack of transportation and also because he was afraid of the Lunda attitude.

In December, 1976, the same platoon leader made another report on gendarme recruitment among youth along the Zaire-Angola border. The platoon leader also indicated the connection and relationship between the Lunda Tribe in Angola and the same tribe in Zaire.

In early March, 1977, before the invasion, Mr. Basembe Emina, district chief of Lualaba made the same report. He confirmed the recruitment and the departure of young Zairians to Angola with the complicity of Mwant-Yaw, the chief of Lunda Tribe.

The Lunda people in most cases were reported to be hostile to other tribes and had facilitated the gendarmes' activities and infiltration in Zaire. Despite these many reports no countermeasures were taken.

CHAPTER 5

THE INVASIONS

SHABA I

The first invasion took place on March 8, 1977, when an estimated 2,000 gendarmes invaded from Angola and captured Kapanga, Dilolo, Kisengi, Matshatsha, and Kasaji.

The invasion plan consisted of: (See Fig. 2)

1. Occupy Kapanga, Dilolo and Sandoa with three companies of ex-gendarmes in civilian clothes (Company K or 11th, Company L or 12th and Company M or 14th).⁴²

2. Proceed on axis Dilolo - Bukama with four companies; stop on the north and west of Kolwezi with two companies. At the same time, with another company, proceed on axis Dilolo - Sandoa - Xinda - Kabondo - Dianda - Bukama, to invade Bukama (objective No. 1 see map).⁴³

3. Attack with two companies on axis Dilolo - Kapanga and then on axis Kapanga - Kanyama, invade Kaniama (objective No. 2 see map).⁴⁴

4. Attack with two companies on axis Dilolo - Sandoa - Kamina, and finally with two other companies which were assigned to occupy Kaniama, attack of Kamina (objective No. 3 see map).⁴⁵

5. Attack after the conquest of Kamina on axis Bukama - Lubudi, Lubudi and Tenke (objective No. 4 - see map).⁴⁶

6. Attack Kolwezi with at least one battalion (objective No. 5 - see map).⁴⁷

7. Establish the "Popular Government" and spread out Marxist influences after the occupation of Kolwezi.




Figure 3

One company of gendarmes attacked the squad of the regular army at Kisenge on March 8, 1977, at 1330 hours. The squad leader in this town was arrested and then killed. Other members of the squad escaped and consolidated at Divuma and Malonga and sent a message to Kolwezi reporting the invasion.⁴⁸

The workers and the population were told by the invaders not to leave Kisenge unless authorized. All private, official, and factory vehicles were seized by the gendarmes. All bank funds and other sources of money were confiscated.⁴⁹

At 1430 hours on the same day, Doctor Escthruth, a missionary at Kapanga, informed Kolwezi authorities by radio that the city was being attacked by strange soldiers.

On March 9, at 1000 hours, the city of Dilolo surrendered to one battalion of gendarmes. The population was not allowed to leave. All radios and cameras were confiscated by the gendarmes. The population was told that the reason of the attack was to "free them"; but after the gendarmes began to confiscate their personal items, most of the population ran to the forests. All people not from Shaba region were suspected of being Mobutu's followers and were either arrested or simply assassinated by the invaders. The gendarmes wore the same uniform as the regular army and it was difficult to distinguish them from the regular soldiers.

The night of 10-11 March, a train from Teixeira-de-Souza in Angola with reinforcements departed for Kasaji.⁵⁰

After the invasion of Dilolo, Kisenge, and Kapanga, the city of Sandoa was occupied on March 15 by the gendarmes. Before this occupation, the 3d Company of the 4th Battalion from Kinshasa,

temporarily stationed at Kolwezi to reinforce the regular forces in Shaba, was sent to Sandoa to prevent the invasion of the city.

Lieutenant Munganga was in charge of the company; but, for unknown reasons, Lieutenant Munganga left Sandoa the night he arrived and went back to Kolwezi leaving the city without any protection or force. The gendarmes entered Dilolo the next morning without any resistance.⁵¹

Later Lieutenant Munganga was arrested and sentenced to death for cowardice and incompetence in military duty especially in war time.⁵²

Two days after the attack of Dilolo, the towns of Kasaji and Mutshatsha were also occupied by the insurgents. The population was tortured and the women abused. Again all bank funds and money were seized.

One week after the gendarmes' invasion, the regular army reorganized and began to counterattack. The central government in Kinshasa requested military aid from friendly countries. In actions against the gendarmes, the regular army was backed by 1,200 Moroccan troops and had strong logistical support from the USA, France, Egypt, Belgium and other countries. By May 21, 1977, 80 days later, the gendarmes of Katanga were driven back to Zambia and Angola or had disappeared into the bush.

This invasion cost not only thousands of innocent lives but also disrupted the economy of the country. Schools, hospitals, bridges, villages, buildings, hotels, post offices, churches, and crops were destroyed. Unemployment and inflation were rampant.

Despite other economic problems still faced by Zaire at that time, colossal amounts of money were spent to maintain and to support the regular forces in these operations. Troops had to be transported

from different garrisons to Shaba. Ammunition, new equipment, medicines, and food were purchased. Gasoline with its high cost had to be consumed to facilitate transport of troops and supplies and to evacuate wounded soldiers from the area of battle. Meanwhile, the U.S. Defense Department placed the 82d Airborne Division and military airlift units on alert for possible evacuation of U.S. citizens from Zaire's combat area.⁵³

SHABA I: COUNTERATTACK

During the first invasion in 1977, President Mobuto Sese Seko of Zaire was in Gbadolite, his hometown where he held a Popular Revolutionary Movement Meeting. General Bumba Moaso Djogi, Chief of Staff of the Zairian Armed Forces (FAZ) was also absent from Kinshasa.

Because of the absence of the Chief of Staff of the Zairian Armed Forces and knowing that the situation was critical in Shaba, President Mobuto decided on March 9 to send Colonel Mampa Ngakwe Salamayfi, Chief of Staff of the Zairian Ground Forces, to Kolwezi to serve as commander of operations, and Colonel Eluki Monga Aundu, Chief of Staff of the headquarters of the President, to assume liaison between the theater of operations and the president.⁵⁴

On March 10, after his return from Gbadolite, President Mobuto held a meeting in Kinshasa with other staff members of the Zairian Armed Forces to direct plans and tactics against the gendarmes.⁵⁵

On March 12, 1977, President Mobutu signed an ordinance creating a position of Inspector-General to enforce regulations and to ensure discipline in the operational zone.⁵⁶ Meanwhile, the enemy situation was vague in Kolwezi. The regular forces in Shaba lacked

communications, ammunition, rations, and medicine. The Second Airborne Battalion (225 troops), which was stationed at Kimbembe (5 miles from Lubumbashi), was sent to Kolwezi and then further on to Kasaji to reinforce local forces which had been diminished.⁵⁷

During the first weeks of the invasion, the military situation appeared critical for the regular forces; but Belgium, France, and the United States immediately started airlifting military supplies to Zaire, and some African countries promised troop support. Fighting men from Morocco arrived to aid Zaire exactly one month after the invaders entered Shaba. A 1,200 man contingent of Moroccan troops landed in Kolwezi in eleven French transport planes.

The invading force obviously expected a general uprising of the people, not only in Shaba but throughout Zaire. General Mbumba of the gendarmes told an interviewer in mid-April that his forces were being augmented by thousands of volunteers, and that villagers in the invasion path were happily welcoming his troops. This report apparently was mere wishful thinking or simple propaganda on Mbumba's part as there was no general uprising and many people abandoned their homes rather than face the gendarmes.⁵⁸

On March 10, 1977, at 1500 hours, Major Ngoka, commander of the 2d Airborne Battalion ordered the 1st and 2d companies of his battalion (with a total of 93 men) to progress from Kasaji to Divuma. One kilometer before the village of Malonga the two companies met with the villagers who told them that the zone was clear and that the gendarmes were not present. After another kilometer the two companies were ambushed by gendarmes and lost one man and all crew served weapons: machine guns, 75 mm cannon, mortars. The men were routed.⁵⁹

In the meantime, it was decided to engage the Kamanyola Division, which had been created six months before the invasion and stationed in Kinshasa and Kitona. The first two battalions of the 11th Brigade of that division arrived in Kolwezi on March 12, 1977. With those two battalions and the remnant of the 2d Airborne Battalion, LTC Monkoti was designated to command the unified units and to hold Kasaji until the arrival of the reinforcements.

On 12 March 1977, while LTC Monkoti was conducting reconnaissance near Kasaji, the gendarmes attacked. Once again the units disbanded leaving behind killed and wounded men and weapons.

On 14 March 1977 LTC Monkoti reassembled the remnant of the men at Kakopa, a village located 10 kilometers from Kasaji, in order to counterattack.

On March 18, while the reassembled units were moving toward Kasaji, the gendarmes ambushed the force. The attack lasted four hours. Two soldiers of the regular forces were killed, two were taken prisoners by the gendarmes, and three were wounded. The gendarmes lost 15 men killed and three land rover jeeps were destroyed.⁶⁰

Because of the misadventure of the regular force President Mobutu was obliged to fly to Kolwezi on March 19 but returned the same evening to Kinshasa because of the death of President Marien Ngouabi of the Republic of Congo. Meanwhile, front line regular forces lacked ammunition.⁶¹

The units of the Kamanyola Division and those from other garrisons had been rushed to Kolwezi to face the deteriorating situation; however, the lack of transportation delayed the movement of the units. On March 15, President Mobutu dismissed Colonel Mampa

Ngakwe Salamay from his command and replaced him with Colonel Eteki Monga Andu, who became the new commander of the operations. Meanwhile, the attitude and orders of General Bumba Moaso Djogi, Chief of Staff of the Regular Forces who had his command post at Kamina, a city located 350 kilometers from Kolwezi, were confused and ambiguous.³⁵ Because of the confusion and numerous withdrawals of the regular forces, President Mobutu decided again to change the operational command staff in Kolwezi. On March 23, a new staff with Colonel Eteki Monga Andu as commander was created. The new staff included:⁶²

- Colonel Eteki Monga Andu: Commander of the Operations.
- Colonel Sasa Mwaka, Special Assistant to the Chief of the Zairian Army Forces was designated Deputy Commander of the Operations.
- LTC Yeka Mangbau Lowanga, G3 of the Zairian Armed Forces as Chief of Staff.
- LTC Kalala, the Battalion Commander at Kolwezi, as G1.
- Major Fethe Mupasa, Deputy G3 of the Zairian Armed Forces, as G3.
- Major Mpukuta Lufimpadio, Deputy G4 of the Zairian Armed Forces, as G4.
- LTC Makengo, doctor, responsible for health.
- Colonel Matumbu, responsible for political coordination within the Zairian Armed Forces, G5.

New plans were elaborated for the defense of Kolwezi and for a counterattack. Meanwhile there were insufficient troops and units to face the situation. The majority of the Kamanjula Division was still in Kinshasa and Kitona; only two battalions of that division had

arrived in Kolwezi. The mixed battalion commanded by LTC Monkoti was completely demoralized and thereby ineffective.⁶³

The night of March 23-24, Major Tshibangu, Commander of Commando Center at Kota-Koli, arrived in Kolwezi with one company.

Next night Major Tshibangu, with his company, took the train for Mutshatsha where he arrived the next morning. After his arrival at Mutshatsha, Major Tshibangu made a quick reconnaissance and installed his company on the bridge over the Mukelesha River located 20 kilometers west of Mutshatsha. While he was there, Major Tshibangu didn't have any maps or means of communication. At the same time, LTC Monkoti moved to Mutshatsha and installed his CP in a box car.⁶⁴

On March 25, 1977, at 1345 hours the gendarmes, who were more familiar with the terrain than the regular forces, attacked Mutshatsha and Tshibangu's position. Because of the lack of communications between frontline units and headquarters in Kolwezi, nobody knew about the attack on Mutshatsha until late in the evening.⁶⁵

In Kolwezi, the commander of the operations did everything possible to acquire replacement units immediately and for that reason he sent LTC Yeka, his Chief of Staff, to Kinshasa in order to explain the difficulties faced by the operational headquarters in Kolwezi.

On March 25, 1977, one company of pygmies from Kitona, commanded by LTC Mukobo, arrived at Kolwezi. With the dispersed soldiers from the 2d Airborne Battalion and the two battalions of the Kamanyola Division who had returned to Kolwezi, and with the company of pygmies, LTC Mukobo was assigned the mission of moving on the axis Nasandoye-Kayembe in order to link up with Major Tshibangu and to reinforce him.⁶⁶

On March 27, 1977, at 1330 hours, Major Tshibangu with his company attempted to counterattack the gendarmes in Mutshatsha; but because the enemy was strong at this point, Major Tshibangu was obliged to break contact with the enemy and asked for reinforcements.⁶⁷ LTC Mukobo with his battalion counterattacked Mutshatsha, but once again the counterattack was unsuccessful. However, he linked up with Major Tshibangu who had withdrawn on March 27.⁶⁸

Since the situation with the regular forces seemed critical, the Department of Defense in Kinshasa decided to create three different operational zone headquarters: The first in Kolwezi with Colonel Eluki as Commander; the second in Kamina with Colonel Ikuku, Commander of the 12th Brigade of the Kamanyola Division had just arrived in Kamina from Kitona with the first two battalions of his brigade, as Commander; and the third in Luiza City located 500 kilometers from Kolwezi in Kasai region with Brigadier General Elumba as Commander. These different operational zones were under General Bumba Moaso Djogi's supervision, who had his headquarters at Kamina.⁶⁹

According to the new plans and organizations, the Commander of Kolwezi operational zone was responsible for the defense of the City of Kolwezi and the counterattack on axis Mutshatsha-Kasaji; and then, on order, the counterattack on Kisenge and Dilolo.⁷⁰

The Commander of Kamina Operational Zone was to link up with units from Kolwezi at Kasaji and stop the enemy at Sasela, a village located 60 kilometers from Sandoa, and at Ndua, a village located on the Tshivunga-Mutshatsha axis to facilitate the counterattack on the southern axis (see figure 3). On order, he was to attack the city of

Kapanga with the secondary effort on axis Mwene-Ditulumbu - Kalamba - Kalume Kapanga.⁷¹

On March 28, the Department of Defense ordered Colonel Ikuku, Commander of the 12th Brigade of the Kamanyola Division stationed in Kitona Base, 500 kilometers west of Kinshasa, to move from Kitona to Kamina with his brigade. For that reason one DC-8 of the Zairian airlines was mobilized to transport the troops.

The same day March 29, President Mobutu once again decided to change the commander of the Kolwezi operational zone. He designated Brigadier General Singa Boyenge Mosambay, Chief of Staff of Gendarmerie of the Regular Forces, as the new commander while Colonel Eluki Monga Andu was to return to Kinshasa to assume his previous responsibilities. Brigadier General Singa arrived in Kolwezi the same day.⁷²

After his arrival in Kolwezi, Brigadier General Singa Boyenge Mosambay held his first meeting with the staff officers who previously worked with Colonel Eluki Monga Andu. In his meeting he reviewed the situation. He ordered Colonel Mika Mpere, communications officer, to provide communications equipment to the troops and to establish liaison and communications within the operational zone. For that reason Colonel Mika Mpere requisitioned 10 AN-PRC 10 sets from the headquarters of the gendarmery of the regular forces in Lubumbashi and two AN-GRC 9 from the gendarmery company of the regular forces at Fungurume even though these radio sets were not enough to equip all units.⁷³ Brigadier General Singa also ordered the pilots to make aerial reconnaissance every day. He specially assigned Major Babua, G2, to organize his staff. Agents from the G2 office were sent to the

front for intelligence gathering purposes. Many Europeans, among them Mr. Renard, a technician at Gecamines, and Mr. Forrest, a contractor in Kolwezi, provided appreciable help and contribution to General Singa in his mission in Kolwezi.⁷⁴

On March 30, 1977, Colonel Songambe, commander of the only airborne division, arrived from Kamina with two battalions and was assigned the mission to defend and install his CP at Kanzenze, a village located 60 kilometers from Kolwezi. Instead and for unknown reasons Colonel Songambe positioned his unit at Munanga, a village located 139 kilometers east of Kolwezi in an opposite direction from the enemy but installed his CP at Kanzenze.⁷⁵

In order to reinforce the operational zone of Kolwezi, the entire 12th Brigade of the Kamanyola Division, commanded by Colonel Ikuku, was placed under the command of Brigadier General Singa Boyenge Mosambay; but the movement from Kamina to Kolwezi took three days because the only means available for them was the train since planes were used only with General Bumba Djogi Moaso's permission. The first elements of that brigade, estimated at 500 men, arrived in Kolwezi by train under command of Major Bilolo, Deputy Commander of the 12th Brigade.⁷⁶

On April 7, 1977, several French officers led by Commandant LeBlanc arrived in Kolwezi to discuss logistical matters with Brigadier General Singa Boyenge Mosambay. Other French officers who constituted the mission in Kolwezi were Captains Davy, Alban, Herman, Maxime, and Julien.⁷⁷ Majors Bilolo and Mbuba made a reconnaissance of Kanzenze, the designated assembly area of the 12th Brigade on April 8, 1977.

Colonel Songambele who previously had his CP in Kanzenze, was ordered to leave the area with all his units and return to Kamina.

Brigadier General Singa Boyenge Mosambay sent a Cessna of the Zairian Air Forces on April 9 to pick up Colonel Ikuku who was still in Kamina with the remainder of his troops. The pilot of the plane came back twenty-four hours later without Colonel Ikuku, who had been placed under arrest by General Bumba Moaso Djogi for unknown reasons. The apprehension of Colonel Ikuku brought new confusion in General Bumba Moaso Djogi's attitudes and made the task and mission of Brigadier General Singa Boyenge Mosambay very difficult.

It is important to point out that during the 12th Brigade's stay in Kamina, the troops had much difficulty finding food. Although there was a variety of foods, General Bumba Moaso Djogi didn't provide them enough: For instance, one 45 Kg bag of rice with sugar was provided for 845 men daily.⁷⁸ In addition, in Kamina there were two "Duhavalland buffalo" airplanes of the Zairian Air Forces capable of transporting 50 men each; but, once again for unknown reasons, General Bumba Djogi Moaso didn't want those planes to transport troops to Kolwezi. For the same reasons all men including officers from the 12th Brigade were not authorized to have quarters or shelters during their stay in Kamina; consequently, all men slept outside in bad weather. Also, the officers of that brigade were not allowed to enter the officers club.⁷⁹ In order to terminate the rivalry between General Bumba Moaso Djogi and Colonel Ikuku and to allow operations to continue, Brigadier General Singa Boyenge Mosambay intervened personally with President Mobutu.

The same day, April 9, 1977, the first Moroccan troops and 200 vehicles were transported to Zaire by ten "transall" type C-160 and one DC-8 of the French Air Forces. At the same time U.S. State Department spokesman Hodding Carter reported that the U.S. would send \$13 million worth of non-lethal military equipment to help Zaire resist the invasion, but refused Zaire's request for additional emergency assistance.

During the night of April 9-10, 1977, final plans for the counterattack were worked out by the operational headquarters with Moroccan participation.⁸⁰

According to those new plans, the concept of operations in Kolwezi sector consisted of counterattacks on two fronts: "Ikuku Front" with the 12th Brigade and Mukobo Front, which had one battalion commanded by Major Shabani, one battalion commanded by Major Ngoie, and one company commanded by Lieutenant Misela.

a. Phase I consisted of a simultaneous attack by "The Ikuku Front" in the south in order to retake the chokepoint on the Lufupa River and the train station of Dikapa (objective 5); then an attack northward, in order to retake the towns of Matanda (objective G1), Sakalez (objective 2), Kayembe (objective 3) and Lubudi (objective 4). After the attack, the 12th Brigade was to concentrate all its units at Kayembe.⁸¹ (See Fig. 3)

b. Phase II was to be a counterattack of Mutshatsha (objective 21) to assure passage on the Mukuleshi and Lungenda Rivers (objective 23) and to hold the village of Samakay, located 10 kilometers south of Mutshatsha (objective 22). (See Fig. 3.)⁸²

c. Phase III was a counterattack to retake the towns of Masoji (objective 31), Kasaji (objective 32), Luashi (objective 33), Nasoni (objective 32 bis), Malonga (objective 34), Divuma (objective 34 bis), Kisenge (objective 35), Mandifu (objective 35 bis) and eventually asanga (objective 36). (See Fig. 4)⁸³

d. Phase IV was to be the capture of the towns of Kahundu (objective 41), Lukama (objective 42), Dilolo-Poste (objective 43), and Diloloville (objective 44). In case of the destruction of the bridges over the Lulua River, the attack was to be launched from Sandoa on the axis Sandoa-Kalishi-Muyeye-Dilolo.⁸⁴ (See Fig.4) While "The Ikuku and Mukobo Fronts" were to counterattack south, other units of the regular army from Kamina were to counterattack in the north in order to prevent the gendarmes from flanking the two fronts and infiltrating into Kamina. According to the plan the counterattacks should be completed by the end of May, 1977. D-Day was fixed for April 1, 1977. On April 9, Colonel Ikuku with the remains of his units in Kamina, and despite the pressure of General Bumba Moaso Djogi, walked about 30 kilometers from Kamina base to the train station in order to requisition a train which had to take him to Kolwezi. He arrived in Kolwezi on April 10.⁸⁵

The same day an Egyptian military delegation arrived in Kolwezi. It is important to point out that Egypt put at the Zairian Armed Forces' disposal some Antonov (Soviet) transport planes (AN 12) for logistical missions between Kinshasa and Kamina.⁸⁶

On April 12 a Zairian Air Force Macchi aircraft bombed Lubudi and the train station at Kayembe where enemy troops were indicated. The same day Brigadier General Singa Boyenge Mosambay and




Figure 5

his deputy Colonel Sasa Mwaka left Kolwezi for Nasandoyi in order to oversee the counterattack. The same day another Moroccan contingent arrived in Kolwezi, which made a total of 620 Moroccan troops.⁸⁷

For security of the counterattack plans all foreign journalists were required to leave Kolwezi on April 12, 1977.⁸⁸

The first contact with the invaders was at a point 10 kilometers from Lufupa train station, located 80 kilometers from Kolwezi and where the first company of the 122d Battalion from the 12th Brigade commanded by Captain Kamba was ambushed. Without returning fire, Captain Kamba withdrew 20 kilometers. For that reason Colonel Ikuku dismissed Captain Kamba and gave the command of that company to Second Lieutenant Bumba.⁸⁹

On April 13 troops from the 12th Brigade with Colonel Ikuku Moboto moved along the railroad since all roads were mined. At 15H30, the troops were 15 kilometers from Lufupa train station. At this point, the gendarmes ambushed the column but with Colonel Ikuku Moboto's determination, and after two hours of fighting the gendarmes were driven away (but they still occupied Lufupa train station). During the fight the regular forces lost five men killed and 20 wounded; among the wounded was Colonel Ikuku Moboto. The gendarmes lost 30 men. Despite his injury, Colonel Ikuku Moboto didn't want to go back to Kolwezi to get treatment; instead he stayed with his unit.

Meanwhile, on the "Mukobo Front" the move started the night of 12-13 April. Twelve kilometers from Nasandoye the leading battalion of the regular forces, which was commanded by Major Shabani, came across one enemy company in the same uniforms as the regular forces. Nine men

were killed and 21 wounded from the Shabani Battalion; the enemy lost seven men killed.⁹⁰

The next day Zairian Air Force Macchi bombarded the towns of Matanda and Sakalezi. The bombardment of the gendarmes' positions had a good psychological impact on the regular forces. But on April 15, 1977, the gendarmes were still in Lufupa train station where they set up another ambush on the "Ikuku Front axis."

Colonel Ikuku Moboto decided to move all tanks (AML) which had been placed under his command and control. The gendarmes had no idea that tanks (AML) could move along the railroad. As a result, the attack on Lufupa train station was successful and the enemy was taken by surprise. Because of this tactic of moving the AML tanks along the railroad, and because of the success of the attack, the men nicknamed Colonel Ikuku Moboto as the "serpent des rails" (railroad snake).⁹¹ During the fight the gendarmes suffered severe losses; among the killed was their commander at Lufupa, Lieutenant Tshimwanga Moise. The gendarmes abandoned ammunition and weapons and ran away.


In the meantime in Kolwezi and after the Lufupa train station was retaken, it was decided to reinforce "the Ikuku Front" with one Moroccan battalion commanded by Major El Madani Abdelkhalek and another Moroccan unit to reinforce the "Mukobo Front." One Moroccan detachment stayed in reserve in Kolwezi and another at Kanzenze. The move for the different fronts took place on April 15, 1977, but 15 kilometers from Kolwezi the Moroccan convoy had a traffic accident and the driver of the command jeep was killed. This was the first Moroccan soldier killed.⁹² The battalion continued to move quickly and joined the 12th Brigade of Colonel Ikuku at Lufupa train station on April 16.

The next day the 122d Battalion, reinforced by Moroccan artillery, recaptured the bridge over the Lufupa River 5 kilometers from Lufupa train station without any problem. Two gendarmes and important documents were captured. That afternoon another Moroccan unit moved to Nasandoye in order to link up with Major Shabani.⁹³

The Moroccan units designated to reinforce the "Mukobo Front" began the counterattack together with the regular forces on that front on April 19.⁹⁴

Two days later the towns of Sakalezi and Kayembe were recaptured by the regular forces reinforced by Moroccan units. The next day, at 1730 hours, the "Front Ikuku" units joined with the "Front Mukobo units."⁹⁵

On April 25, the units on "The Mukobo Front" moved to Mutshatsha in order to counterattack, but they didn't meet any resistance; the gendarmes had withdrawn and never forgot the thrashing they had received at Lufupa train station by Colonel Ikuku. In Mutshatsha the gendarmes left Soviet and East German ammunition, equipment, and weapons which were then sent to Kolwezi. (See Figure 5)



To raise the morale of the troops, President Mobutu arrived in Mutshatsha on April 26, 1977.

After Mutshatsha, Sakalezi, Kayembe, and Masoji were retaken, intelligence reports indicated that the enemy was no longer resisting. In fact, the enemy was retreating, leaving behind dead and wounded men, supplies, munitions and weapons. For that reason it was decided that the continuation of the counterattack and the pursuit of the enemy was to be led by Colonel Ikuku, and all units from the "Mukobo Front" were placed under his command. Meanwhile, LTC Mukobo was designated to defend the city of Kolwezi with selected units.⁹⁶ Also, when Mutshatsha was recaptured, the threat to Kolwezi was over. Through the first three weeks of May the Zairian-Moroccan force continued to press westward retaking the territory and towns that the rebels had seized so easily during the early days of March and were now giving up with little or no resistance.

While counterattacks were being conducted in the Mutshatsha Sector by the Zairian-Moroccan troops, seven foreign journalists and reporters who departed from Zambia were arrested at Samakayi, village located 10 Km south of Mutshatsha by the Regular Forces. Those journalists and reporters were from the weekly West Germany "Stern" and the Spanish television. They were: Francisco Javier Garcia, Benita Iglesias, Juan Manuel, Fernandez, Jesus Gonzales Green, Francis Colin Smith (from the "Observer", England) Follath Erick and Regis Bossu.

Curiously they didn't have official visas, instead they had permits delivered by the Angolan authorities of the popular movement of the liberation of Angola (MPLA) which is known to have strong ties with the invaders. In addition, they had a list, addresses and telephone

numbers not only of Angolan authorities but also of some Zairian authorities to contact with the itinerary to follow.

In spite of this, President Mobutu ordered their release.⁹⁷

A Moroccan detachment killed two men of a squad probably lost at Sanikosa on May 4. Ammunition, weapons, and documents were abandoned by the gendarmes at Sanikosa. Among the documents a coded message was found, addressed to Captain Fortain Claude Capalo who was believed to be a Cuban communications officer, and a bundle of false military I.D. cards. The false military I.D. cards were printed in Angola and were similar to those used by the Zairian regular forces, but they didn't have a serial number as do authentic I.D. cards.⁹⁸

The Regular forces moved from Sanikosa to Musaji where the enemy was expected on May 7, but once again the gendarmes retreated before the counterattack by the Zaire-Morocco forces could be launched. After installing his units in defensive positions in Musaji, Colonel Ikuku Moboto, with Lieutenant Tshitaka, S2, and Captain Mabilala, S3 of the 12th Brigade, took a helicopter for Mutshatsha where the colonel was to be treated for his injury received at Lufupa on April 13, 1977. On their return the same day to Musaji, the pilot of the helicopter became lost ; he landed the helicopter in the bush and spent the night there.⁹⁹ Meanwhile, a French detachment comprised of Captain Raquin and two second lieutenants arrived in Kolwezi to reinforce LTC Delpit who replaced Commandant LeBlanc. Their mission was to create one tank troop from those already engaged in combat and others which were to come from Mbanza-Ngungu, a tank base located about 120 kilometers west of Kinshasa.¹⁰⁰

On May 8 Colonel Ikuku returned to Musaji. At 1145 hours the unit moved toward Kasanganga without resistance. Brigadier General Singa joined "The Ikuku Front units" at Kasanganga. That evening, plans were made to counterattack the town of Kakopa which was recaptured on May 9, with little resistance. However, in their retreat, the gendarmes buried many mines in the roads and around villages and towns. Those minefields slowed down the movement of the regular and Moroccan troops.

The move to Kasaji began on May 11; however, because of the minefields along the axis of advance, the town of Kasaji was not retaken until May 12, at 0830 hours. With Moroccan artillery and Zairian forces, the town was recaptured without resistance.¹⁰¹ Because of its location, and to avoid surprise, security measures were strengthened in Kolwezi: The Tshibangu Battalion was assigned to defend Malonga bridge on Lukoshi River located 6 kilometers from Kasaji and then to occupy the village of Djongo; one company of Major Mbombo's battalion defended the crossroads of Sapasa on axis Malonga-Kisenge, located 15 kilometers from Kasaji; the battalion of Major Tshiembe was to occupy the town of Luashi, 90 kilometers south of Kasaji; the battalion of Major Shabani was assigned to retake the town of Nasoni, at the crossroads of axis Sandoa-Kasaji-Kamina.¹⁰² Zairian troops made a triumphant entry into the town of Kasaji on May 12, 1977, after it was abandoned by the gendarmes.¹⁰³

During the night of May 15-16, in his operational order, Brigadier General Singa Boyenge, ordered Colonel Ikuku Moboto's units to conquer their respective objectives by May 20. According to plan, Major Shabani and his unit took Nasoni on May 17 at 0900 hours. The

next day at 1130 hours the town of Djongo was retaken by two battalions commanded by Majors Tshibangu and Mbombo.¹⁰⁴ One 60 mm and one 81 mm mortar, many rounds of 60 mm, and 81 mm, 106 mm and 120 mm ammunition were abandoned by the gendarmes and recovered by the Zairian and Moroccan forces. The same day Major Tshiembe and his battalion occupied the bridge on Luashi River. At 1700 hours Major Mbombo and his battalion, reinforced by one Moroccan company, occupied the town of Divuma.¹⁰⁵

During the night of May 18-19, a company-sized joint unit of Zairian and Moroccan troops occupied the bridge on Divuma River, located 5 kilometers from Divuma. During his retreat, the enemy had blown up three bridges on the Luashi River, located south of Kisenge.¹⁰⁶ On May 19, at 1000 hours, Major Tshiembe and his battalion arrived and occupied Luashi. At 1515 hours, the town of Kisenge was conquered by Major Tshibangu and his unit. At Kisenge, the gendarmes left 80 cows which had been stolen at Sandoa.¹⁰⁷

The next day Brigadier Singa Boyenge Mosambay joined Colonel Ikuku Moboto at Kisenge. With two Zairian platoons leading, followed by two Moroccan squads, the force entered Dilolo during the night at 2230 hours without resistance.¹⁰⁸ The following day at 0700 hours all units assigned to the recapture of Dilolo joined the two Zairian platoons and the two Moroccan squads. During the search of the city of Dilolo, ammunition, equipment and different military materials were found. However, before the retreat, and prior to the destruction of the railroad bridge at Dilolo, the gendarmes evacuated to Angola 15 box cars of the "Societe Nationale Des Chemins De Fer Zairois," all government vehicles stolen at Kisenge, one diesel locomotive and some

railroad cars, 6 tanks (AML), 3 tractors, 2 Unimog trucks, and one land-rover jeep. Also, all money of private enterprises like Petro-Zaire, Regideso and Onafitex were seized and taken to Angola.¹⁰⁹

While the Ikuku Front units were moving on the southern axis to conquer all towns occupied by the gendarmes, other regular forces from Kamina did the same in the north.

At the beginning the units from Kamina consisted of only one battalion commanded by LTC Vuadi na Palata; this unit was reinforced later by another battalion commanded by Major Kabangu. The move of Vuadi's battalion began with the occupation of the town of Kafakumba on May 6. It is important to point out that the Luba population between Kamina and the Lubilashi River, was cooperative with the regular forces and didn't panic. From Lubilash to Sandoa, a Lunda Tribal region, the population collaborated with the gendarmes.¹¹⁰ Despite rains, the roads were still in good condition. From Kamina to Kafakumba there were two different roads one on the north and one on the south. The Vuadi battalion lacked sufficient supplies, communications equipment, and men.

It is also important to point out that General Bumba Moaso Djogi was called back to Kinshasa by President Mobutu; he arrived in Kinshasa on April 15, 1977. After General Bumba Moaso Djogi left the operational zone, the Department of Defense decided to reinforce the Vuadi battalion with one company from Kitona. On April 20, Colonel Dikuta Ebilansang, commander of the 13th Brigade of the Kamanyola Division, was designated as commander of the units on the north. Before going to Kamina, Colonel Dikuta Ebilansang was to report to the headquarters at Kolwezi to be briefed by Brigadier General Singa

Bosenge Mosambay. While Colonel Dikuta Ebilansang was in a Zairian Air Force C130 which transported him to Kolwezi, General Bumba Moaso Djogi, once again for unknown reasons, surprisingly sent an urgent message to Kolwezi, calling Colonel Dikuta Ebilansang back to Kinshasa. The Department of Defense authorities were surprised to see Colonel Dikuta Ebilansang back. He was interrogated by General Bumba Moaso Djogi, judged and curiously released. He finally arrived in Kamina on April 24.¹¹¹

The move toward Sandoa by the Vuadi Battalion did not begin until May 11 because of lack of rations and ammunition. Major Kabangu and his battalion joined LTC Vuadi Na Palata at Kafakumba.

The Vuadi Battalion occupied the town of Samuyemba on May 12. One truck was destroyed 4 kilometers before Samuyemba by an antitank mine, and 6 men were wounded. While the Vuadi Battalion prepared defenses, one platoon of Kabangu Battalion moved toward Nasori on axis Tshipao-Kasaji, to assure the rear security of the Vuadi Battalion by clearing the zone between Tshipao-Pwelete to the Kashileshi River where junction was to be made with the Ikuku Front units.¹¹²

The same day the Kabangu Battalion was ordered to move toward Sandoa. On May 18 the Kabangu Battalion was ambushed by the gendarmes at Samaki, but no casualties were reported. The Vuadi Battalion followed the next day.

The Kabangu Battalion was again ambushed at Sandumba on May 20. During the counterattack, the gendarmes disbanded and left ammunition and weapons. The Vuadi Battalion and the tactical CP elements of Colonel Dikuta Ebilansang joined the Kabangu Battalion at this point. After one hour, the move toward Tshimbalanga was started

by the Kabangu Battalion, the tactical CP, and the Vuadi Battalion. After three hours, the leading company of the Kabangu Battalion was again ambushed at Ngungu. One enemy 81 mm mortar round exploded in Colonel Dikuta's jeep; the colonel suffered a fracture and was evacuated to Kolwezi; three other men were also wounded. The gendarmes lost ten men killed and abandoned ammunition and weapons.¹¹³

On May 23, 1977, Colonel Sasa Muaka arrived at Samundumba. He ordered the continuation of the movement toward Sandoa. At 1600 hours the units arrived at Tshimbalanga without resistance. After 30 minutes, the units departed to Sawamba where they occupied positions on May 24 at 1400 hours.

The next morning, with aviation support, the units progressed toward Sandoa. At 1210 hours the leading elements entered Sandoa and at 1330 hours all units arrived and occupied Sandoa.¹¹⁴

As on other sectors and fronts, Kapanga and Musumba were retaken without resistance by regular forces commanded by Colonel Mulimbi Mabilo responsible for Kapanga Zone. Kapanga was retaken on May 26. Meanwhile, Colonel Mabungu Soko Kombe commander of the 1st Commando battalion cleared the zone between Kapanga and Luiza.

The losses during the invasion of the regular forces were 247 men killed, 343 wounded, and 8 missing.¹¹⁵

SHABA II

The first invasion should have served as a warning to Zairian intelligence services. Instead, the intelligence organizations, both civilian and military, failed once again to accomplish their missions. Before this second invasion there were indications of gendarme

activity, but those indications were not exploited. Although there were rumors in Shaba that trouble was imminent, the city of Kolwezi was defended by no more than 300 Zairian troops.¹¹⁶

Once again the copper-rich region of Shaba was invaded by an estimated 5,000 gendarmes from their bases in Marxist-run Angola on May 13, 1978, at 0600 hours. The gendarmes came from two different directions. Some moved along the Benguela railroad, which runs from Shaba through Angola to the Atlantic Ocean. Others passed through the northern tip of Zambia, whose Lunda tribesmen are friendly kin of the gendarmes. They traveled in small groups and wore native dress, but carried AK 47s and other Soviet-made equipment over their shoulder.¹¹⁷ The move was made in 45 days by foot. Like the villages in north-western Zambia and Angola, most of the gendarmes were Lunda tribesmen and it was easy for them to mix with the locals.¹¹⁸

The gendarmes had been in Kolwezi for several weeks. Large numbers of strangers were being seen in Kolwezi before the attack. They became familiar with the population and some even sympathized with their old friends and relatives in Kolwezi. The gendarmes had excellent intelligence on the regular force activities and weaknesses while no officials were aware of the gendarmes' presence in Kolwezi. This second invasion was not only bigger and better planned; it was also, according to Washington, actively supported by Cuban troops who had been training the gendarmes in Angola.¹¹⁹ Although there had been some controversy about Cuban participation in Kolwezi, some witnesses of the Kolwezi attack reported the presence of Spanish-speaking observers who might have been Cubans. Jose Gomes Jardim, a Portuguese resident of Kolwezi, said he had seen and heard

four black men and one white speaking Spanish during the assault.¹²⁰ On May 16, the Cuban official newspaper "Granma" noted fighting but made no reference to Zaire's allegation that Cuban troops were involved.¹²¹

After they occupied the city of Kolwezi, the gendarmes carried out cold-blooded executions, slaughtering at least 100 whites and 300 blacks, before they were driven from the city.¹²² The final known death toll from the mid-May siege of the mining city of Kolwezi stands at 855, according to the Zairian Red Cross and the International Committee of the Red Cross.¹²³ The number of foreigners confirmed dead in the week-long war was 136, most of them Europeans but also a few Libyans and Pakistanians working in Kolwezi. Those Libyans and Pakistanians were executed because the gendarmes mistook them for Moroccans.¹²⁴

The total of Zairian civilians known killed in the war is estimated at 300; of this number, 85 were women.¹²⁵

The other casualties, roughly 419, were either Zairian or rebel soldiers killed in the fighting. These figures were compiled by the International Red Cross on the basis of the body count carried out by members of the Zairian Red Cross, which buried corpses found in and around Kolwezi. The actual number of deaths may have been somewhat higher since some Zairians are known to have been buried privately by their families.¹²⁶

Virtually all of the 3,000 white residents of Kolwezi were airlifted to Belgium, where many told anguished stories of gendarmes terror and massacre. The city was without food, water, or electricity; streets were littered with unburied bodies rotting in the hot sun.

During the gendarmes' occupation of Kolwezi, men were rounded up and taken to the invader's headquarters in the bank or nearby schools for long periods of interrogation by the gendarmes. Without explanation, some were released; others were taken away and never seen again.

The most horrifying scene took place in one small room of a residence where 34 men, women, and children, all Europeans, were executed by machine-gun fire.¹²⁷ Almost every white-owned house in the city was subjected to looting of jewelry, money, clothing, and almost anything else that could be dropped into "collection" baskets the gendarmes carried.¹²⁸

Hearing radio reports that Europeans in Kolwezi were being brutalized by the Katanga gendarmes, French and Belgian units came to assist Zaire. With the Zairian 311th Airborne Battalion, which had captured the Kolwezi Airport with Major Mahele as battalion commander, they pushed the gendarmes into isolated pockets. It is important to say that the 2d Company of the 311th Airborne Battalion was the first unit to be parachuted in Kolwezi before the French and Belgians arrived; this company was commanded by Captain Mosala-Mondja, a U.S. Army Command and General Staff College graduate. In the attack on the airport, two helicopters and four macchi jets belonging to the Zairian Air Force were destroyed on the ground. Two other macchi jets were damaged.¹²⁹

At week's end the gendarmes' hold on Kolwezi was broken and a mass airlift of refugees began. With the terror and massacre committed and perpetrated by the gendarmes, most of the foreign residents wanted to leave the country permanently. The white survivors insisted that they

would never go back, out of fear that a reign of terror in which their friends had lost their lives could be repeated.

After the liberation of Kolwezi, three railroad cars filled with weapons, ranging from Soviet AK-47 automatic rifles to Israeli-UZI sub-machine guns were found in Kolwezi.¹³⁰ Along with the guns and ammunition were stores of food, including U.S. military rations, cans of fruit salad, and frankfurters. Much of the material had been stolen from Zairian regular forces depots in Kolwezi.¹³¹

The gendarmes' retreat was well organized. According to villagers in the area, at least one refueling vehicle came from Angola packed with jerricans of gasoline. Although the gendarmes had come into Zaire on foot, many rode home aboard an estimated 350 vehicles stolen from Kolwezi residents.¹³² Most of the gendarmes had transistor radios slung across their backs; others carried small tape recorders and other stolen goods. A few had weapons.¹³³

SHABA II COUNTERATTACK

After the invasion of Kolwezi on May 13, 1978, all Zairian forces were on alert. Meetings were held in Kinshasa to assess the situation. While contacts were being made with friendly countries, the 311th Airborne Battalion stationed in Kinshasa with Major Mahele as commander was given the mission to counterattack Kolwezi as soon as possible. This battalion had been created only six months before the invasion. For this unit, it was the first opportunity to make contact with a hostile force. After the last meeting on May 14 at the headquarters and because the CP of the regular forces in Kolwezi was surrounded by the invaders, it was decided that the 2d Company of the

311th Battalion would parachute into Kolwezi with Captain Musala-Mondja as commander; the remainder of the battalion had to land at Lubumbashi and proceed by trucks from Lubumbashi to Kolwezi to ensure the zone was clear.

On May 15, 1978, the C-130's of the Zairian Armed Forces were readied to transport troops from Kinshasa to Lubumbashi where the tactical command post was installed under supervision of Colonel Yeka, G3 of Zairian Armed Forces.

On May 17, 1978, at 0500 hours the 2d Company boarded two C-130's and after a 45-minute flight the planes reached Kolwezi and the paratroopers jumped. After a lengthy attack, Captain Mosala and his company progressed toward the surrounded CP of the 14th Bde, the unit initially tasked with securing of Kolwezi.

Meanwhile Major Mahele and the remainder of his battalion progressed without enemy resistance from Lubumbashi to the Lualaba Bridge located 20 kilometers from Kolwezi. There Major Mahele met with the 133d Infantry Battalion of the regular forces which had a mission to defend the bridge. After a brief meeting between Major Mahele and Major Mputu the commander of the 133d Battalion, it was decided that the 133d Infantry should reinforce the 311th Airborne Battalion with at least one company for the movement to Kolwezi.

Early on the morning of May 17, 1978, 5 kilometers from the Lualaba Bridge, the 311st Airborne Battalion made first contact with the invaders who were trying to progress toward Likasi. After a short attack, Major Mahele took the initiative and moved forward with all his companies dismounted. At the Kanzenbe train station located 8 kilometers from Kolwezi, the 311th Battalion was ambushed for the second time.¹³⁴

The longest and most difficult attack took place on May 17, 1978, at 1100 hours at the Kolwezi airport, where Major Mahele lost six men and had ten men wounded.¹³⁵ Major Mahele secured the airport at 1415 hours.

While the 2d Company of the 311st Battalion occupied the headquarters building near the Kolwezi General Hospital located 5 kilometers from the airport and the remainder of the 311th Airborne Battalion held the airport, downtown Kolwezi was still under gendarme control.

After consulting with French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing and the Belgian Government, and because of the reports that Europeans hostages in Kolwezi were being brutalized by the Katanga gendarmes, the French and Belgian governments agreed to send units to assist Zaire.

On May 17, 1978, the French 11th Airborne Division stationed in Calvi, Corsica, commanded by Colonel Philippe Erulin was placed on alert.¹³⁶ This unit arrived in Kinshasa the next day. The first echelon was comprised of the regimental CP, scout platoon, 81 mm mortar platoon, and four rifle companies, and departed Corsica aboard five French four-engined jets for a ten-hour non-stop flight. It arrived at Kinshasa during the night. The second echelon, about 100 vehicles, was flown in on May 19, 1978, to Lubumbashi by USAF cargo planes.¹³⁷ To support the operations the United States sent 18 C-141 jet transports that flew many logistics missions for the French and Belgian forces.¹³⁸

The French Legion's concept of operation was to create, within a few minutes after landing, such overall confusion in the new and old

towns of Kolwezi that the gendarmes would be left with no alternative but to run for their lives before they had time to think of the hostages.¹³⁹

From a detailed study of the map, the commander was able to determine:

(1) The crossing points the rebels would have to use, whatever their routes of withdrawal. He decided to place roadblocks at these points to cut off withdrawing elements and to recover the hostages.¹⁴⁰

(2) The key points inside the town, where solid strong points were to be simultaneously installed as bases from which patrols could spread out and infiltrate as safely as possible.¹⁴¹

(3) A zone of action for each company, since the terrain dictated decentralized action.¹⁴²

Although the airfield had already been retaken by the 311th Airborne Battalion of the Zairian Forces, Colonel Erulin decided not to land on the airfield, four miles out of town, but rather to jump on the outer edges of the old and new towns of Kolwezi.¹⁴³

The tactical CP, 1st, 2d, and 3d companies were to land on DZ "A" and each company would conduct search and kill operations across its given sector to prevent the gendarmes from executing any hostages.¹⁴⁴

The second wave consisting of a heavy C.I., scout platoon, mortar platoon and the 4th Company, was to jump on either DZ "A" or DZ "B", or both, as directed from the ground according to the situation that developed.¹⁴⁵

Particular orders were given that the units were to reach their primary objectives, roadblocks and strong points as quickly as possible and were not to be delayed by their own casualties. To avoid adding to the confusion that certainly prevailed in the towns, fire at random and suppressive fires were prohibited. Moreover, to avoid casualties among the populace, the men were told to open fire only on formally identified and located enemy.¹⁴⁶

The jump was not easy. The atmospheric conditions over Kolwezi were extremely poor, the wind was at 18 feet per second from the west; the altitude of the drop zone was 4,500 feet, the relative altitude of the aircraft was 600 feet above ground level; and the aircraft speed at time of jump was 130 knots, or 150 miles per hour.¹⁴⁷ Besides poor weather conditions, the "Legionnaires" had never jumped with the T10 parachute which had been borrowed from the Zairian forces. In addition, the flight path was a little too far to the south, and instead of landing a few yards north of the old town, the "Legionnaires" came under inaccurate fire from the gendarmes while in the air, hit trees, houses, and even the railroad station. However, only four fractures and two sprains were reported.¹⁴⁸

Fifteen minutes after landing, all three companies were ready to progress toward the objective and at this time four rebel light machine guns had been eliminated and two counterattacking armored cars had been destroyed.¹⁴⁹

Despite their number and armament (Kalashnikov, M 16 rifles, light and heavy machineguns, rocket launchers, recoilless rifles and mortars) the gendarmes could not resist against the well-coordinated attack. By sunset the old town had been occupied by the Legionnaires




Figure 8

and hostages freed. Legionnaires' patrols and ambushes were maintained throughout the night by platoons with a most effective combination of daylight combat techniques and night fighting tricks. By so operating, the French denied the gendarmes any possibility of reorganizing, concentrating, and counterattacking.

On May 20, 1978, the second wave consisting of a scout platoon, heavy CP, mortar platoon and the 4th company was ordered to jump early in the morning. The scout platoon was assigned to attack Camp Forrest while the mortar platoon was to be in a position to support operations in both the old and new towns and roadblocks and checking escape routes. The 4th Company jumped on DZ "A" and assaulted the new town from the east.¹⁵⁰ The gendarmes were once again surprised and were unable to react. In a few hours the new town was controlled by the French troops.

While the French troops advanced in the old and new towns, the Belgian paratroopers landed on the airport and began to evacuate all the Europeans in Belgian Air Force C-130's during the next two days.

After taking the old and new towns, the French troops handed the responsibilities of the towns to the Belgians and at the same time the French troops concentrated on the neighboring uncontrolled areas.

The afternoon of May 20, the 3d Company advanced across Manika. One gendarme strong point was assaulted and occupied before dark.

On May 23 mopping up Manika was completed and a series of motorized patrols were employed.

On May 27 the French troops sent the last patrol some 30 miles from Kolwezi and no enemy contact was reported.

After the operations in Kolwezi the French troops were sent to Lubumbashi where they established patrols to restore confidence among Europeans. Later, the French troops were relieved by a Pan-African Force from:¹⁵¹

Morocco:	2,000 troops
Senegal:	600 troops
Togo:	160 troops
Gabon:	50 troops

On June 6, 1978, USAF C-141's began flying the French troops back to Corsica.¹⁵²

FIGURE 9

ORIGINAL MAP FILED WITH

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CHAPTER 6

COSTS AND LOSSES

SHABA I

The two invasions created serious problems in the country's economy and stability. Besides the other economic problems still faced by Zaire and the colossal amounts of money spent during and after the invasions, Zaire was in a difficult position trying to reestablish its economy and repair damage caused by the gendarmes. The economy of the country was at a standstill, and it was not likely to get moving again until the departed European technicians who worked in the Shaba mines could be replaced by Zairians. But the replacement could take at least three months.

Because of the invasions other economic sectors such as food production and cash crops didn't produce as expected. For instance, in 1977 the cotton harvest estimated at 250,000 tons produced only a few tons. Almost all cotton, peanut and corn fields had been burned by the gendarmes.¹⁵³

After Shaba in 1977, all agricultural material of the "Commission Agricole Du Shaba" (CASHA) the cost of which was estimated about 590,000Z (1Z=\$1.23 in 1977) or \$725,700 had been looted by the gendarmes.¹⁵⁴

Farmers in Lulaba district (Shaba region and south Kolwezi) lost almost all their livestock; more than 2,000 cows strayed into the bush and some were taken to Angola by the gendarmes.¹⁵⁵

The following table shows the material cost and losses after the first invasion in 1977.¹⁵⁶

A. KASAJI AREA:

Hospital of Lweu	120,000Z	or	\$147,600
Hospital of Ngarengaze:	170,000Z	or	\$209,100
CASHA buildings:	50,000Z	or	\$ 61,500
Train transportation facilities:	180,000Z	or	\$221,400
Private enterprises:	670,150Z	or	\$824,284.5

TOTAL	1,190,150Z	or	\$1,463,884.5
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B. KISENGE AREA:

Hospital of Kisenge:	50,000Z	or	\$ 61,500
Quarters for agents and workers:	175,000Z	or	\$215,250

TOTAL	225,000Z	or	\$276,750
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C. SANDOA AREA:

Hospital of Sandoa:	50,000Z	or	\$ 61,500
Dispensary of Mwajinga:	10,000Z	or	\$ 12,300
School of Manshid:	30,000Z	or	\$ 36,900
Official School of Djuwa:	150,000Z	or	\$184,500
Primary schools of Sandoa:	20,000Z	or	\$ 24,600
Veterinary School of Sandoa:	10,000Z	or	\$ 12,300
Office of Mayor of Sandoa:	20,000Z	or	\$ 24,600
Public Offices	120,000Z	or	\$147,600

TOTAL	410,000Z	or	\$504,300
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D. KAPANGA AREA:

Samuteh Hospital at Musumba:	10,000Z	or	\$ 12,300
Ntita Hospital at Musumba:	3,000Z	or	\$ 3,690
Primary Schools of Musumba:	20,000Z	or	\$ 24,600
Administrative Offices of Musumba:	30,000Z	or	\$ 36,900
Agents' Quarters:	21,000Z	or	\$ 25,830

TOTAL	84,000Z	or	\$103,320
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E. DILOLO AREA:

Hospital of Dilolo:	20,000Z or	\$ 24,600
Administrative Offices:	130,000Z or	\$159,900
Post Office of Dilolo:	30,000Z or	\$ 36,900
Public Offices:	255,000Z or	\$313,650
Nunnery of Dilolo:	4,000Z or	\$ 4,920
Monastery of Dilolo:	3,000Z or	\$ 3,690
Train Station at Dilolo:	50,000Z or	\$ 61,500
Private Enterprises:	<u>66,200Z</u> or	<u>\$ 81,426</u>
TOTAL	558,200Z or	\$596,586

Grand total of 2,467,350Z or \$3,034,840.5

The following table shows the destroyed bridges and ferry boats.¹⁵⁷

- Bridge on Kasangeshi River
- Bridge on Kashileshi River
- Samulenga Bridge (axis Sandoa-Kasaji)
- Bridge on axis Kasaji-Lushi
- Bridge on axis Katoka-Luashi
- Bridge on railroad between Dilolo and Lobito

(in Angola)

- Bridge on axis Dilolo-Angola
- Ferry boat on Sakubema River (between Sandoa and Kapanga)

The cost of these bridges and the ferry boat are unknown; however, it could be estimated at least 150,000Z or \$196,800.

These bridges and the ferry boat play a major role in Zaire's economy, as agricultural and other products are moved to big cities such as Lubugashi, Likasi and Kolwezi by these means. The railroad between Dilolo and Lobito (Angola), called the Bengwela Railroad, is the most important because 90 percent of Zairian natural resources are exported to Europe and other countries through it. This railroad is

quicker and more economical for the Zairian government to transport its copper and other natural resources such as cobalt, manganese, zinc, silver, cadmium for export. The road linking Lubumbashi - Likasi - Kolwezi - Dilolo and Lobito (in Angola) is vital to Zaire's economy.¹⁵⁸

In 1977 the copper production was 490,000 tons but because of the invasions the production went down to 380,000 tons in 1978.¹⁵⁹ The invasion of Shaba has sharply boosted the free-market price of cobalt.

SHABA II

After the second invasion the losses were as follows:

A - 311th: 26 men killed and forty wounded.¹⁶⁰

B - French troops: 5 men killed in action (one sergeant, three corporals and one EM), and 25 men wounded in action.¹⁶¹

C - Population: Zairians: 300, of this number 85 were women. Foreigners: 136.¹⁶²

D - Gendarmes: 250 men killed; 1,000 modern weapons lost including four recoilless rifles, 15 mortars, 21 rocket launchers, 10 HMGs and 38 LMGs; two armored cars destroyed.¹⁶³

In addition, it is important to point out that in the 311th Airborne attack at the airport, two helicopters and four Macchi jets belonging to the Zairian Air Force were destroyed on the ground. Two other Macchi jets were damaged.¹⁶⁴ The cost of the helicopters and Macchi jets are unknown, what is known is that the cost was high.

E - Finally, stores, hotels, banks, post offices, schools, and hospitals were looted and destroyed by the gendarmes.¹⁶⁵

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS

Beyond all doubt military intelligence is very important for the Armed Forces all over the world. Without intelligence no army, even the most powerful in the world, can win a war. The Shaba Invasions demonstrate this clearly. Even though there were rumors about the danger of possible invasion, it seems that during both invasions no preventive measures were taken. Information and reports about the invasion plan were neglected and not exploited. One officer who made reports about the gendarmes' intentions to invade Zaire was punished and considered a panic-maker by reporting such information. Nobody exploited the hostile and strange attitude of the Lunda that the invaders moved by foot with equipment and weapons from Angola, violating the territory of Zambia on their way, and penetrating 100 miles deep into Zaire without being detected.

Zaire is surrounded by nine different states and with a coastline extending only 23 miles, is vulnerable to outside attacks.

Shaba Province is essential to Zaire's survival: its copper mines provide the bulk of the country's annual revenue of \$1.3 billion. In 1960, United Nations Forces were dispatched to the area to put down an abortive independence movement led by the late Katangan

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leader Moise Tshombe, whose memory is still revered by many of the Angola based rebels.

Before the two invasions, antagonism had existed between Zaire's President Mobutu and Angola's President Agostino Neto since Zaire strongly backed the FLNA faction of Holden Roberto against Neto MPLA faction during the Angola War in 1975.

In 1976, Zaire and Angola signed an accord to normalize relations. Nothing resulted from this accord and relations between the two countries worsened.

In March 1977, some 2,000 Katangans gendarmes crossed from Angola into the Shaba region, Zaire's economic heartland which supplies 70 percent of Zaire's foreign exchange.

Angola provided logistical support and allowed the invaders to march into Shaba, armed with Soviet equipment and trained in part by Cuban advisors in Angola.

The invading force obviously expected a general uprising of the people, not only in the Shaba region and among the Lunda Tribe but throughout Zaire. In an interview of mid-April 1977, General Mbumba, leader of the gendarmes declared that his forces were being augmented by "thousands of volunteers", and villagers in the invasion path were happily welcoming his troops. Whether this report was mere wishful thinking or simple propaganda on Mbumba's part is not clear; however, there was no general uprising.

However, some officials and high ranking officers were involved and accused of having concealed knowledge of the invasion were arrested, among them Ngunza Kari I Bond, a Lunda from Shaba and a relative of Tshombe, Foreign Affairs Commissioner and the Chief of

Staff of the Zairian Army.

There were other dismissals, arrests and disciplinary actions against many people accused of having been involved in the Shaba invasions, including Bizeni-Mana, Ngunza's principal advisor, Munguya-Mbenge, ex-provincial commissioner of Shaba, Mwant Yav, the Great Lunda Chief, Colonel Mampa Ngua, chief of staff of Zairian Ground Forces and several top officers were arrested because of poor performance of Zairian Forces under their command.

Militarily, the invasions were surprisingly successful as the Zairian Army put up little resistance. The Gendarmes advanced, at times to the welcoming but more often to an apathetic population of fellow tribesmen.

From a politico-military perspective, however, the invasions failed. The Katangans overestimated the degree of popular support they would receive. The group, under General Mbumba's leadership, offered no real program or ideology to gain backing.

The invaders underestimated President Mobutu's political acumen. The president knew the most effective way of portraying the attack in order to gain international support and the most effective means of securing such assistance. Rather than relying upon international organizations, either the OAU or the UN, he dispatched personal emissaries to states including Morocco and France whose international or domestic situation inclined them to lend a helping hand.

Mobutu's diplomatic position was strong as the Katangans committed the two cardinal sins of modern African ethics by violating international borders and arming refugees to fight against a homeland.

The Shaba Invasion of 1977 created various reactions from African countries as well as from all over the world. The majority of the African countries such as Nigeria, Morocco, Sudan, Egypt, Uganda, Gabon, Senegal, Ruanda and Burundi severely condemned the invasion. The organization of African Unity also condemned strongly the invasion as did most western countries. After the second invasion a Pan-African Force was installed in Shaba Region for security purposes.

During the first few weeks of the 1977 invasion the military situation was difficult for the regular forces. Troops were not prepared and were poorly equipped. Information about the gendarmes' activities in Angola and the invasion plan itself was not exploited, consequently the invaders met little resistance.

The United States, France, Belgium and other countries such as Egypt, China, and Saudi Arabia played a major role in providing supplies to the Regular Forces. Some African heads of state promised troop support. Fighting men from Morocco arrived to aid Zaire exactly one month after the invaders entered Shaba.

The turning point of Shaba I was when the town of Mutshatsha was recaptured on April 20, 1977. The threat to Kolwezi was then over. During the first three weeks of May the Zairian-Moroccan Force continued to press westward, retaking the territory and towns that the rebels had seized so easily during the early days of March and were now giving up with little or no resistance. No great battles were fought.

The most important question raised by the Katangan invasion was why the Zairian military was unprepared and unable to repulse the invaders.

As President Mobutu said on July 1, 1977, the Zairian Armed Forces suffered a moral defeat due, not to bad soldiers but to bad leaders. After the invasion, President Mobutu assumed direct control of the army, dismissed the chief of staff of the Zairian Armed Forces, General Bumba Moaso Djogi, retired 30 to 40 high ranking generals and colonels, and ordered a total reorganization of the armed forces which received additional assistance from Belgium, France, China and the United States. Money was requested from the United States in FMS credits for fiscal year 1978 to be used in part, to improve mobility and communications, replenish supplies and provide ground force equipment. Also, the government increased its defense spending. Equipment was purchased from friendly countries and the US, France, Belgium and China provided military assistance in reforming the Army.

During the next few weeks President Mobutu sought solutions to the military problems through sweeping reforms of the command structure and wholesale firings of high-ranking officers. He merged the military general staff and deployed his forces throughout the country instead of keeping them in close proximity to Kinshasa. The Kamanyola division and the 12th Infantry Division were permanently assigned to Shaba. In addition to these changes in structure and deployment that were taking place during the remainder of 1977, the overall strength of the Zairian Armed Forces (FAZ) was cut by 25 percent, a remarkable feat during a year of national crisis but presumably a purging action that rid the army of undesirables and disloyal elements.

Shaba I delayed the early efforts to stabilize Zaire's economy.

Shaba II, which followed approximately one year later, was economically a more crippling blow. When the gendarmes seized Kolwezi on May 13, 1978, Zaire's mineral production stopped completely. The government was forced to divert badly needed funds into the military counterattack. More significantly, the evacuation of the foreign technicians made the return to pre-invasions production levels more difficult. Both westerners in Shaba and the province's citizens had vivid, unpleasant memories of the gendarmes' incursion, especially in Kolwezi where hundreds of foreigners and Zairians were massacred.

After the invaders came to Kolwezi, Lunda people welcomed them with joy but after a short period of time, they realized that things were going to be even worse than they were under Mobutu.

The multinational airlift undertaken May 18, 19 and 20 to rescue European hostages in Kolwezi demonstrated the abilities of the air forces involved to organize quickly and effectively, and execute limited interventions of this sort. It also underscored the lack of capability by North Atlantic Treaty Organization Forces, other than US Air Force, to airlift the heavy, bulk military ground equipment that has become common in recent years. In fact in France, a large fuel tanker was found to be too big even for the C-141s and a C-5 was called from West Germany.

US, French, Belgian and British Air Forces took part in the Zaire rescue effort. The town of Kolwezi was populated by about 2,000 - 2,500 Europeans and other foreign nationals and families, who were there to operate the copper and cobalt mines.

About 50 military transport aircraft from the four countries took part in the airlift and subsequent rescue operation aimed at withdrawing the Europeans and other foreigners from Kolwezi.

As noticed in this rescue mission, the operation was quick and apparently, the main reason that the French and Belgians provided troops was to preserve only their own interest. This operation would have lasted longer if no French or Belgian troops and no US logistical support were provided and if there were no Europeans in Kolwezi and if the Kantanga region was not the critical producer of cobalt and copper which are important to these countries.

After the invasions, some French and Belgian officers stayed in Zaire to assist in the rebuilding and restructuring of the military training of the FAZ in order to improve its combat capability. The French were involved in training airborne units in Kinshasa and Kamina, the Belgians trained the 12th Infantry Division in Lubumbashi and the Chinese helped establish one commando division in Kisangani.

One of the side benefits from the 1977 invasion was the influx of new weapons and equipment, and the increase in military aid from Belgium, France, the PRC, and the United States for 1978.

A major concern in many industrial countries was the security of the copper and cobalt fields in Shaba Province, and the prospectives for future supplies of those minerals from Zaire. The uncertainty was particularly critical for cobalt, because Zaire accounts for half the world's total supply of this element.

Zaire continues to face severe economic problems caused in part by the invasions, the fall in copper prices several years ago, and the rise in petroleum prices.

With the assistance of friendly nations and international institutions, Zaire is undertaking the reforms including an international monetary fund stabilization program needed to revive its economy. The United States has taken the position that it will aid Zaire in its recovery effort, but that continued US assistance will be linked to sustained progress on economic measures, as well as on the broad range of political and military reforms now underway. However, the foreign military sales financing program is declining since 1977. For instance for the fiscal year 1976 the cost was estimated at \$29 million while it is only \$7 million for the fiscal year 1981 and \$10.5 million for the fiscal year 1982.

Zaire has been traditionally supportive of the US on issues of mutual concern in Africa and in international Fora. Zaire's stability and economic strenght are important to the United States given its strategic location in the heart of Africa; its position on the northern flank of southern Africa, with its critical complex of issues; and its production of the strategic mineral coalalt, providing some 75 percent of US imports of that metal.

Zaire's relations with its neighbors are improving. The normalization of relations with Angola has relieved some of the threat along the 1,400 mile frontier with Angola. However, Zaire continues to view with concern the presence in Angola of some 19,000 Cuban troops and sophisticated Soviet weapons, as well as remnants of the ex-Katanga. gendarmes.

In fact, after the second invasion external and internal pressures made clear the consequences, actual and potential, for Mobutu's regime in Zaire and that of Agosinho Neto if hostilities

continued. Both apparently decided that it was to their advantage to reconcile their differences, and to that end several meetings between the two, and between high officials representing them, were held in the summer of 1978. At the end of July a communique announcing the imminent establishment of diplomatic relations between the two states was issued. The meetings also resulted in agreement that Zaire would end its support for the antiNeto forces it had been harboring and that Angola would disarm the Zairian rebels responsible for the Shaba invasions. It was also announced that the Benguela railroad, the cheapest and most efficient export route for Zairian copper, was to be reopened.

During the first invasion in 1977, a number of African countries, for a number of reasons, offered help or at least sent messages of support to Zaire's President. They included the Ivory Coast, Senegal, Gabon, Burundi, Rwanda, Sudan, Mauritania, the Central African Empire, Kenya, Uganda, Tunisia and Egypt. Morocco's military aid turned a potential debacle into a victory for Zaire. This help was in conformity with Morocco's own stance reflecting King Hassan's concerns about the lack of stability in African countries and about Soviet contributions to destabilization. In addition Morocco's actions may have been affected by Agostinto Neto's recognition of the Saharan Arab Republic, proclaimed in 1976 by the anti-Moroccan Polisario in the former Spanish Sahara.

Zaire's relations with Congo (Brazzaville) were troubled and ambivalent from 1968 to 1970 due to suspicions of Congo Government for Zaire being involved in an abortive coup against President Marien Ngouabi in 1970. After the situation was clarified the relations

became normal. However, in 1977 the river traffic was stopped temporarily, as had happened often before, during a period of strain caused by various plots uncovered in either of the two countries.

Rwanda, another Zaire neighbor has excellent relations with Zaire. In fact, in September 1976 an accord was signed between the two countries for the establishment of an organization called Economic Community of the Great Lakes (which included Burundi) with a seat at Gisenye, Rwanda.

Friendly relations exist between the Central African, Chad and Uganda. Zaire helped Chad with military training in 1978.

Despite some fluctuations, Zaire has good relations with Belgium who send technicians to Zaire for military training and the public sector. Belgium participated in operations to help Zaire fight against the invaders.

In 1978 France was Zaire's third largest trading partner, after Belgium and West Germany, and provided considerable aid, some of it military. France intervened militarily during the second invasion of Shaba, and professed goals not only of a rescue mission but to curb the expanding Soviet influence in Africa.

Zaire's relations with China (PRC) were cold at first because it had given help to the rebels, and Mobutu opposed its admittance to the UN. But by 1972 President Mobutu began to view the PRC as an important counterweight to the Soviet Union. Zaire recognized the PRC along with North Korea, and East Germany in November 1972, and in the following year Mobutu paid a state visit to Peking. From then on relations between the two countries remained cordial.

Because of their support of the Shaba invasions, Zaire broke off relations with Cuba and suspended relations with East Germany in the Spring of 1977. Relations with North Korea cooled after they recognized Neto's regime, and North Korean military instructors who trained the Kamanyola division left Zaire in the spring of 1977.

Because of their common antipathy for Soviet and Cuban activity, relations between Zaire and the moderate middle eastern states remained friendly despite Mobutu's shifting stance with respect to Israel. This common interest was reflected in 1978 at the time of the second Shaba invasion when King Khalid of Saudi Arabia recommended a firm stance against Soviet and Cuban interference in African affairs.

Actually the government of Zaire is trying to strengthen its authority, to build the nation's international prestige, and increase the social and economic development of the Zairian people with emphasis on agricultural production.

After the two invasions, President Mobutu promised to institute democratic reforms, with some members of the political bureau elected directly by the people. He also announced that members of the legislative council would no longer be nominated by the political bureau but directly by the people. Regional and urban councils would be elected entirely by universal suffrage. Of the thirty members of the political bureau, only twelve would henceforth be nominated by the President, and eighteen would be elected, two in each region and the city of Kinshasa. Moreover, anyone, including well-known political opponents, could run against Mobutu in the Presidential elections.

A post of Prime Minister which had been abolished in 1966 was reinstated. The Prime Minister would appoint the members of the Executive Council and coordinate their activities. President Mobutu also pledged to improve human rights by ending police and soldier brutality against villagers.

Additional measures were taken to avoid future invasions of the Shaba region by stationing two Zairian divisions in the region.

At present, Zaire and US have joint interests in implementing the IMF stabilization program; training and equipping the Army to repel another invasion; limiting the expansion of Soviet and Cuban influence and presence on the continent; and seeking rather moderate African solutions to Africa's problems. The United States has traditionally supported African solutions to the continent's problems and limited outside interference by big powers. Such goals were, of course, violated during the Angolan Civil War and by the massive Soviet intervention and introduction of Cuban troops.

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REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

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ATZL-SWY

26 July 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR ATTN: Larry Downing, DTIC-OCQ, Defense Technical Information
Center, 8725 John J. Kingman Road, Suite 0944,
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